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n March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into
law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“Patient Protection Act”), promising that it “will set in
motion reforms that generations of Americans have fought
for and marched for and hungered to see.”1 Minutes later, 14
state Attorneys General sued to prevent implementation of
the Act, arguing that it is unconstitutional.a,2
The lawsuits might be considered the most recent
chapter in the post-1965 health reform saga, in which
intense political battles have stymied efforts to address
the nation’s growing health care crisis. As this recent battle
leaves Congress and heads to the courts, we are reminded
of that famous quote: “The law is what the judge says it is.”b
Similarly, the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says
it is, or rather, what a majority of Supreme Court Justices
says it is. This commentary describes both the Attorneys
General claims and the legal framework in which they will be
examined, should their claims proceed to a court’s scrutiny.
It must be recognized, however, that any legal analysis of
a dispute of this magnitude is inherently connected to the
political context in which such a dispute arises. Accordingly,
policy experts need to understand both the relevant law and
the underlying politics, and any constitutional analysis of the
Patient Protection Act rests, as a foundational matter, on the
ultimate determination of nine Justices.

Political Background
As is well known, the Patient Protection Act navigated
through highly partisan currents and passed Congress on a
narrow party-line vote. Despite repeated exhortations from
both Republicans and Democrats that bipartisan consensus
is both possible and desirable in any health care reform
package,c and despite oft-repeated statements by leaders of
both parties that Democrats and Republicans are primarily
in agreement on most foundational matters,d the Act was
approved amid highly contentious, and often vitriolic,
accusations. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell
(R-Kentucky) called the bill “a monstrosity held together by
special deals, a rejection of the clear will of the voters, and
presidential appeals to put party first.”3 Senator Jim DeMint
(R-South Carolina) called it a “trillion dollar assault on our
freedoms [and an] arrogant power grab [that] proves that
the President and his party care more about government
control than the will of the American people.”4 Even months
after passage, Republican campaign materials continue
emphasizing the Act’s promotion of government largess,
describing the Act as a “government takeover of health
care.”5 (Democrats, it must be noted, engaged in equally
sharp and immoderate language, accusing Republicans of
“[standing] with insurance companies and their Washington
lobbyists and against reform.”6)

a. The Florida Attorney General filed a suit on behalf of 13 state Attorneys General, and the Virginia Attorney General filed a separate
suit. Additional constitutional challenges against the Patient Protection Act were filed by the Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons, Inc., New Jersey Physicians, Inc., and the Thomas More Law Center. The complaint filed by the Florida Attorney General
was amended on May 14, 2010, to include two more state Attorneys General and five governors (plus the National Federation of
Independent Businesses) bringing the total of state plaintiffs to 20.
b. This quote is sometimes attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes, as emblematic of the philosophy of legal realism. See Brigham J,
Harrington C. Realism in the authority of law. Social Epistemology. 1991;5(1):20-25 (describing quote as “Holmes’s dictum”). Other
sources attribute the quote to Lord Reid, in: Reid L. The judge as law maker. J Socy Pub Tchrs L. 1972;12(22):22-29.
c. See, e.g., Chaddock GR. A bipartisan health care plan? ‘Yes we can,’ say former senate leaders. Christian Science Monitor. June 17, 2009
(describing a bipartisan proposal by former Senators Daschle, Dole, and Baker as “a counterpoint to the first Senate markup of health
care legislation, which fell out along sharply partisan lines”).
d. See, e.g., Berger J. McCain nudges Obama toward his party’s health plans. New York Times. January 24, 2010 (reporting that Republican
Senator John McCain, whom Obama defeated in the 2008 presidential election, urged Democrats to join Republicans in bipartisan
negotiations, saying “[t]here are things we can agree on”); Obama BH. Remarks at the Opening Session of a Bipartisan Meeting on Health
Care Reform [transcript]. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000122/pdf/DCPD-201000122.pdf. Published February 25, 2010.
(“[W]hen I look at the ideas that are out there, there is overlap. It’s not perfect overlap, it’s not a hundred percent overlap, but there’s
some overlap.”)
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Republican fears of unconstrained and corrupting
government expansions of power are echoed in the state
Attorneys’ General suits.e The complaint filed by the Florida
Attorney General, which was amended on May 14th and
now is on behalf of 20 state plaintiffs, decries the Patient
Protection Act as “an unprecedented encroachment on the
liberty of individuals” and “an unprecedented encroachment
on the sovereignty of the states.”7 Accompanying lawsuits
challenging the Patient Protection Act’s constitutionality

constitutional principles. The Constitution creates a federal
government of only limited authority, and thus any federal
action must rest on one of the enumerated powers listed in
the Constitution. But the Constitution also places additional
independent limits on federal powers, and any federal action
that transgresses these limits is unconstitutional even if it is
otherwise within one of the enumerated powers. Accordingly,
a constitutional analysis of the Patient Protection Act will
proceed in two parts: (1) does the authority to implement
the Act reside within one of the federal
government’s enumerated powers? And
if so, (2) does the implementation of the
Act transgress one of the Constitution’s
independent limits on federal power?
The constitutional provisions that will be
interpreted and applied in this analysis
are the provisions intended to preserve
the nation’s federalist system.
The constitutional challenges to the
Patient Protection Act rest primarily on
two arguments, each corresponding to
one of the steps in the above constitutional
analysis.f The first argument charges that
the Patient Protection Act relies on federal
powers that are beyond those enumerated
in the Constitution. The second argument
claims that the Act encroaches upon the
sovereignty of the states and thereby
transgresses independent constitutional limits on federal
power. Thus, two related and fundamental constitutional
principles—limits to federal power and protections of state
sovereignty—serve as the foundations to the legal attacks
on the Patient Protection Act. They also have been the focus
of what were likely the Rehnquist Court’sg most significant
decisions. All of the Rehnquist Court’s seminal cases that
delineated its federalism jurisprudence were divisive five-tofour decisions, and even though four of the Rehnquist Court’s
nine Justices have since retired, the Court’s current make-up
(assuming Elena Kagan is confirmed as the next Justice and

On March 23, 2010, President
Obama signed into law
the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act…Minutes
later, 14 state Attorneys General
sued to prevent implementation
of the Act, arguing that it is
unconstitutional.
further charged that the Act “imposes unprecedented
government mandates that restrict the personal and
economic freedoms of American citizens,”8 “forc[es]
the collectivization of health care and the establishment
of a system of socialized health care in this country,”9
and requires judicial relief “to preserve individual liberty
and choice under Social Security, as well as to prevent…
bankrupting the United States generally and Medicare and
Social Security specifically.”10
Behind the complaints’ sweeping rhetoric are important
legal issues that implicate nothing less than foundational

e. Additional partisan tension has erupted within individual states. Four Democratic governors promptly distanced themselves from
their own Attorneys General, stating their support for health reform and calling the Act “the single most important reform of our
health care system in decades.” Pennsylvania Office of the Governor. Governor Rendell joins other governors in offer to help US
Attorney General defend legality of new national health care act [press release]. Published March 26, 2010. http://www.portal.
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_789728_0_0_18/Governor%20Rendell%20Joins%20Other%20Governors%20
in%20Offer%20to%20Help%20U.S.%20Attorney.doc (reprinting governors’ letter to US Attorney General Eric Holder). Meanwhile
in Georgia, the Democratic Attorney General refused the request of the state’s Republican governor to challenge the federal
health reform law. See Baker TE. Letter to Governor Sonny Perdue. Published March 24, 2010. http://law.ga.gov/vgn/images/portal/
cit_79369762/157880827Response%20to%20Perdue.pdf. (“This litigation is likely to fail and will consume significant amounts of
taxpayers’ hard-earned money in the process.”)
f. The collection of legal challenges to the Patient Protection Act include other legal arguments in addition to these two constitutional
claims, including the Thomas More Center’s claims that the Patient Protection Act violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause, and additionally amounts to an unconstitutional tax; the Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons’ claims that the Act was passed in violation of federal officials’ fiduciary duties to the United States; and the
New Jersey Physicians, Inc.’s claim that the Act “denies the republican nature of our system of government.”
g. Chief Justice William Rehnquist; member of USSC from September 26, 1986-September 3, 2005.
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votes similarly to President Obama’s first selection) appears
to be unchanged on matters of federalism. It might even be
said that on these contentious matters, the Supreme Court
has been as partisan as Washington’s other politicians.
Thus, there is an ideological parallel between the
legislative politics that surround passage of the Patient
Protection Act and the judicial politics underlying the
Rehnquist Court’s new federalism. However, perhaps unlike
the nation’s elected officials, the Supreme Court features
the admirable quality that even when bitterly divided, the
Court’s majorities and dissents must justify their votes on
principled and detailed legal arguments. The Court puts
on an intellectually transparent process, and any judicial
action is expected to relate to current law and be attendant
to values that reflect the foundation of our system of
government. Accordingly, those legal principles and political
values deserve serious discussion.

Enumerated Powers
The search for enumerated constitutional powers
that authorize Congress to pass the Patient Protection
Act includes a clever lawyer’s trick: the matter of
characterization. The lawsuits aimed at the Act include a
challenge to the “individual mandate,” the requirement that
each American (subject to certain exceptions and subsidies)
is required to purchase health insurance. Congress’ authority
to require such a mandate would fall under Congress’ power
to regulate interstate commerce. However, some cleverly
observe that the so-called individual mandate is merely a tax
(and, at a maximum of $2,250 per family per year, not a very
large tax) that is assessed on those who opt not to purchase
health insurance, much like a fine the Environmental
Protection Agency might impose on those who fail to comply
with certain environmental regulations. If the “mandate” is
nothing more than a tax, then Congress’ power to impose
such a mandate-cum-tax falls under its general taxing
powers. Accordingly, how one characterizes what Congress
has done can meaningfully determine whether Congress has
the power to do it.

The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants the federal government the
power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several States.”11 The Supreme Court in the previous
century took the Commerce Clause on a jurisprudential
rollercoaster, first reading the Clause narrowly to authorize
Congress to regulate strictly commercial matters that
indisputably involved interstate transactions, and then
reading the Clause broadly to authorize Congress to regulate
any conduct that indirectly affected interstate prices and
commercial exchange (which is virtually everything). The

Rehnquist Court pulled the pendulum back in the 1995
seminal case United States v. Lopez,12 both reasserting
limits to Congress’ commerce power and reiterating that
the federal government is endowed only with enumerated
powers.
In United States v. Lopez, the Court ruled that Congress did
not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to pass
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited
the possession of a firearm in a school zone. Writing for the
five-member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
that “[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the possession be connected
in any way to interstate commerce.”13 The Court went on to
rule that unless a disputed congressional action squarely
regarded a channel or instrument of interstate commerce,
then Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is
limited to activities that “substantially affect” interstate
commerce.14
Lopez, much more than invalidating the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990, reestablished limits to Congress’
commerce power,h and it accordingly holds great appeal to
conservative jurists and politicians who object to laws that
restrain or dictate economic conduct. Many opponents
of the Patient Protection Act invoke these conservative
principles in objecting to the Act’s “individual mandate”
for the purchase of health insurance, arguing that requiring
individuals to purchase any good or service infringes on
economic liberties and amounts to a government intrusion
into the personal sphere. Accordingly, invoking Lopez, they
argue that such a government mandate is beyond the powers
allocated to Congress by the Constitution. Georgetown Law
Professor and libertarian jurist Randy Barnett argues that
the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate
only commercial activities, and that “the health care
mandate does not purport to regulate or prohibit activity
of any kind, whether economic or noneconomic. To the
contrary, it purports to ‘regulate’ inactivity.”15 Conservative
legal commentator David Rivkin offers a more existential
argument, decrying that “the problem with an individual
insurance purchase mandate…is that it does not regulate
any transactions at all. It regulates human beings, simply
because they exist.”16 And John Yoo, who served as Deputy
Attorney General under President George W. Bush, puts it
in blunt and colloquial terms: “the Court has never upheld
a federal law that punishes Americans for exercising their
God-given right to do absolutely nothing.”17
Jurists supportive of the Patient Protection Act are
predictably both more sympathetic to exercises of federal
power and more expansive in interpreting what federal
powers are authorized under the Commerce Clause. Some,
such as the American Constitutional Society’s Simon

h. The Supreme Court, in another bitter five-to-four decision, reaffirmed these limits on Congress’ commerce power in United States v.
Morrison (2000), which invalidated certain provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.
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Lazarus, argue that even under Lopez, the individual mandate
is squarely within the powers authorized by the Commerce
Clause. Since insurance markets often require regulation to
facilitate risk pooling, avoid adverse selection, and organize
efficient claims administration, Lazarus concludes that the
individual mandate is an “eminently lawful” exercise of the
Commerce Clause’s power.18 Noted liberal scholar and dean
of the University of California Irvine School of Law, Erwin
Chemerinsky, frames the conservative argument in terms of
individual rights rather than on limits on federal power, and
argues that “there is no constitutionally protected freedom
to be able to refuse to be insured or to avoid paying for the
benefits provided.”16
Within the debates interpreting the scope of Lopez
and the meaning of the Patent Protection Act’s individual
mandate, an ideological divide emerges that parallels the
divide among the legislators who debated it in Congress.
Although legal analysis is often depicted as a technical and
non-ideological enterprise, it should not be surprising that
one’s political philosophy—and perhaps one’s opinion of the
underlying legislation—shape one’s legal analysis.i What
might distinguish this constitutional debate from typical
political clashes, however, is how necessarily forwardlooking it is. It is—or should be—recognized that whatever
the Constitution authorizes a Democratic Congress to do
today, it theoretically authorizes a Republican Congress to
do tomorrow.

The General Welfare Clause
Congress’ power to tax falls within the General Welfare
Clause, which empowers Congress “To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States.”19 If the “individual mandate” is little more than a tax
(that can be avoided if insurance is purchased), then the
constitutionality of the mandate-cum-tax is assessed under
the General Welfare Clause.j
The General Welfare Clause has not (yet) undergone
the same jurisprudential swings as the Commerce Clause.
Although the Supreme Court in the 1930s and 1940s
concurrently expanded Congress’ authority under both
clauses, the Rehnquist Court pulled back only on the

Commerce Clause power. In contrast, the Court has not
departed from its New Deal rulings that granted Congress
broad authority and discretion to tax under the General
Welfare Clause.
The leading authority continues to be the 1936 case
of United States v. Butler,20 in which the Court, echoing
Alexander Hamilton during the Constitutional Convention,
ruled that the General Welfare Clause gives Congress “a
substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by
the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the
general welfare of the United States.”21 The Court later gave
Congress additional latitude under the Clause, ruling that
Congress also had the discretion to decide whether certain
taxes or expenditures advance “the general welfare.”22
This constitutional threshold is much more easily satisfied
than the Lopez test, and thus current interpretations of the
General Welfare Clause likely support Congress’ authority
for instituting the tax embedded within the Patient Protection
Act’s insurance mandate.k,23
Of course, what the Supreme Court giveth it can also
taketh away. Some have advocated that Lopez and the
Rehnquist Court’s other federalism watershed decisions
should be extended to Butler, and thereby limit Congress’
authority under the General Welfare clause.24 It certainly
is possible that the Court might reign in Congress’ other
powers, including those under the General Welfare Clause,
and continue the Rehnquist Court’s reconceptualization of
federalism. While such a ruling would likely expose many
laws to new constitutional scrutiny, it also would reduce
the sometimes artificial distinction between mandates from
taxes.

Independent Limits to Federal Power—AntiCommandeering and the 10th Amendment
Even if the power to pass the Patient Protection Act does
fall within Congress’ enumerated powers, independent
constitutional limits on federal authority might nonetheless
make the Act unconstitutional. The state Attorneys General
invoke a number of constitutional provisions—including
Article 1 Sect. 1, Article 1 Sect. 2, and Amendments 5, 9,
and 10—that, they claim, are designed to preserve their
states’ sovereignty against overreaching federal policy.

i. This phenomenon might be related to “cognitive biases” exhibited by other professionals, such as how environmental forces and
preexisting beliefs have been shown to frequently shape physician diagnoses. See, for example, Wennberg D, Dickens J Jr, Soule D, et
al. The relationship between the supply of cardiac catheterization laboratories, cardiologists and the use of invasive cardiac procedures
in northern New England. J Health Serv Res Policy. 1997;2(2):75-80.
j. Perhaps the leading commentator who characterizes the mandate as a tax (for constitutional purposes) is Jack Balkin, a professor at
Yale Law School and creator of the popular Balkinization blog for constitutional legal analysis.
k. Even if the individual mandate is, for constitutional purposes, merely a tax, some of the complaints allege that it is an unconstitutional
tax, prohibited by Article I, Sect. 2 and Sect. 9. These constitutional provisions prohibit direct capitation taxes on individuals, such as
head taxes, if they are not apportioned by the states. Critics of the Patient Protection Act argue that the mandate-cum-tax is a direct
capitation tax because it is assessed on each individual. Defenders say it is a penalty tax, not a capitation tax, because it does not tax the
general population but rather a subset of individuals based on their conduct. The Supreme Court has narrowly defined direct taxes and
thus limited the taxes that would require state apportionment, but it has spoken very infrequently on the distinctions among permissible
and impermissible taxes since the 16th Amendment, authorizing Congress to impose an income tax, was ratified in 1913.
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The length of this list of constitutional provisions suggests
that the argument in defense of state sovereignty is based
as much on the structure of the Constitution as it is on any
single clause. But more than any competing provision, the
10th Amendment represents the Constitution’s protections
of state sovereignty, and the leading cases that protect that
authority are derived primarily from that Amendment.
The 10th Amendment, in its entirety, reads “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”25 Justice Storyl famously
described the Amendment as “a mere affirmation of what,
upon any just reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpreting
the Constitution,” and saying little more than “what
is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state
authorities.”26 Nonetheless, the 10th Amendment has come
to represent the “Court’s consistent understanding [that]
‘the States unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure
of sovereign authority.’”27
The 1992 case of New York v. United States28 is a
modern and seminal expression of the Court’s recent 10th
Amendment jurisprudence. The case arose when New York
State objected to its obligations under the Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, in which Congress
required states to devise plans to dispose of waste
generated within their borders. After conceding that “the
Court’s jurisprudence in this area has traveled an unsteady
path,”29 a five-member Supreme Court majority ruled that
the 10th Amendment prohibited full implementation of the
1985 Act. The Court concluded that the 10th Amendment
restricts how the federal government may “use the States as
implements of regulation,” and that it specifically proscribes
Congress from “commandeer[ing] the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.”30 The Act accordingly
violated the 10th Amendment by “commandeering” the
states’ legislatures to implement the federal waste disposal
policies. The Supreme Court, in an identical and equally
contentious five-to-four decision, reiterated the 10th
Amendment’s “anti-commandeering” protections of state
sovereignty in Printz v. United States (ruling, in 1997, that the
10th Amendment prohibits Congress from commandeering
state executives to implement federal policy) and Alden v.
Maine (ruling, in 1999, that the 10th Amendment similarly
prohibits the commandeering of state courts).
It is this resistance to being “commandeered” by federal
policy, and the anti-commandeering principles embedded in
New York and related 10th Amendment cases, that motivate

the state Attorneys’ General second species of constitutional
challenges to the Patient Protection Act. This same
inclination to assert state autonomy motivated the State
of Virginia to enact a “nullification statute” stating that “no
resident of this Commonwealth…shall be required to obtain
or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage.”31
(Idaho and Utah have enacted similar statutes, and at least
33 states are reportedly considering other measures.)32 The
constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection Act arise
from the states’ attempts to assert sovereignty over their
own health policy.
The state Attorneys’ General complaints specifically
protest the Patient Protection Act’s charging states to
establish local insurance exchanges, in which state residents
can purchase, and the state’s insurance companies can
market, health insurance policies. The complaints allege that
setting up these exchanges will require state budgetary and
personnel resources, and that the Patient Protection Act’s
expansion of Medicaid benefits will burden already-strained
state Medicaid programs. These requirements amount,
according to the complaint drafted by the Florida Attorney
General, to “effectively co-opting the Plaintiffs’ control over
their budgetary processes and legislative agendas through
compelling them to assume costs they cannot afford, and
…depriv[ing] them of their sovereignty and their right to a
republican form of government.”7
Defenders of the Patient Protection Act first observe that
Medicaid is a voluntary program from which states may
opt out, if they are willing to forgo their share of the very
substantial federal Medicaid funds.m Moreover, they observe
that states are merely invited to set up their exchanges, and
that the federal government will set one up for them if they
fail to do so. These legislative provisions might reflect what
the New York Times described as the Patient Protection Act’s
“careful” drafting process, designed for the new law “to
withstand just this kind of challenge.
Perhaps a larger legal obstacle to these assertions of
state autonomy is the Supremacy Clause, which states that
Congressional Acts ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land.’”34
Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, Timothy Jost,
a professor at Washington and Lee University School of
Law, cites unsuccessful examples of state nullification laws
throughout history, suggesting that “although the [Virginia]
bill is phrased in the passive voice, its intent is clearly to
block the implementation of a federal mandate requiring all
individuals to carry health insurance. But achieving this aim
is constitutionally impossible.”35 Accordingly, the federal
government’s authority is supreme so long as it operates

l. Chief Justice Joseph Story; member of USSC from November 18, 1811–September 10, 1845.
m. The Supreme Court in New York reiterated that Congress retains broad authority to induce certain action from states by placing
conditions on federal funding. 505 US 144, 166-67. It has been observed that the growth of the federal government might mean
that giving Congress broad “spending power” could undermine any remaining federalism limit on federal authority, and thus the
Supreme Court might ultimately reign in this broad authority as well. See Siegel NS. Dole’s future: a strategic analysis. Sup Ct Econ Rev.
2008;16:165-204.
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within its enumerated powers and does not encroach upon
an independent constitutional limit, and just as the federal
government might be limited from making state policy, the
states are prevented from making (or blocking) federal
policy. Thus, although parts of the Constitution are clearly
designed to protect state sovereignty, other—arguably more
potent—parts clearly limit it.

Next Steps? Political Rhetoric, Legal Parsing,
and Substantive Policy
Some conservative legal scholars have said publicly that
the Attorneys’ General suits (and likewise similar arguments
by conservative jurists) are politically motivated and are
unlikely to garner judicial sympathy. Charles Fried, who
served as Solicitor General under President Ronald Regan,
was quoted for saying of the legal challenge, “I am prepared
to say it’s complete nonsense.”36 But most Court watchers
were surprised when the Court handed down Lopez, the first
judicially-imposed limit on Commerce Clause authority since
the New Deal, and the Court’s recent expansion of the 10th
Amendment similarly reversed prior constitutional trends
and expectations. Given the Court’s often unpredictable
penchant for leveraging a five-member majority to achieve
potent and far-reaching constitutional shifts, the legislative
significance of the Patient Protection Act might attract,
rather than deter, Supreme Court scrutiny.n Of course, since
most of the Patient Protection Act’s provisions won’t go
into effect until 2014, the identity and proclivity of that fivemember majority remains unknown.
Yet there remain at least two tragic disconnects in this
rhetorical debate over federal power. The first is the irony
between the states’ assertions of sovereignty and the states’
true potential to shape health care policy. The real source of
frustration to advocates of state sovereignty in health policy
is that, at least since 1965, American health policy has been
largely federal policy. It has become conventional policy
wisdom that meaningful health reform requires federal
action, whereas state action is sought primarily by those
pursuing incremental reform or experimental tinkering. Yet
state law governs a host of important implements of health
policy—including professional licensure, medical torts,
insurance regulation, and the administration of Medicaid—

that arguably exceeds the significance of federal policy.
Because the size and influence of the federal budget swamps
what states can afford, it is predictable and understandable
that the federal government has the oversized influence on
health policy (and most policies) that it does. But this need
not be so. To the contrary, it might be in state experiments—
particularly the fusion of health policy with the instruments
of other policy, such as education and public safety—
that holds the greatest promise for redressing America’s
health crisis. The nation continues to invest in health
care expenditures without recouping returns in improved
health, so perhaps it is the non-medical and ground-level
reforms—which are in the domain of the states—that will
have the greatest impact.o Thus, those seeking to assert
state sovereignty in making health policy both have a broad
menu of meaningful policy options available and should be
encouraged to thoughtfully exercise that sovereignty.
The second disconnect is between the rhetoric and reality
of the Patient Protection Act, which is commonly presumed
to be (even if constitutional) an expansive exercise in federal
power. In budgetary terms, and perhaps in constitutional
terms, it arguably is. But it can barely be expected to put
a dent into America’s growing and consuming health
care crisis. The nation’s health care system is commonly
characterized as a three-dimensional crisis of insufficient
access, excessive costs, and inadequate quality. The Patient
Protection Act might amount to a meaningful expansion in
health care access, but it does nothing to reduce the costs
of health care or improve the quality of health care services.
For a nation that now spends over 17% of its gross domestic
product on health care and over twice the per capita average
of the 10 richest nations,37 yet exhibits health outcomes that
are worse than nearly all of its OECD colleagues,p laurels
cannot rest following an expansion of access. Far from
being either “reforms that generations of Americans have
fought for”1 or a “trillion dollar assault on our freedoms,”4
the Patient Protection Act is more likely a mere first step in
a desperately needed overhaul of our health care system.
Unless health care expenditures are contained, and unless
our health care system can more efficiently improve the
nation’s heath, then the Act’s expansion of access to
health insurance will mean little more than accelerating

n. Shortly after the Bill’s passage, Georgia’s Republican Senator Saxby Chambliss insisted, “There are such significant issues that the
court could very well declare the bill unconstitutional.” See, “Healthcare reform may reach high court.” UPI.com website. http://www.
upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/03/29/Healthcare-reform-may-reach-high-court/UPI-22701269882434/. Published March 29, 2010.
But George Washington University Law professor Orin Kerr took a pragmatic view of the chances a challenge would actually make it
to the Supreme Court: “there would first need to be a circuit court that would vote to strike down the mandate. Presumably you’d have
to bring the challenge…; pray you get a panel with at least two of the circuit’s more aggressive conservatives; and then hope you can
get past a rehearing vote. But the odds of that are pretty low. There’s a chance, I think, but it’s a relatively low one.” Kerr O. More on the
chances courts would strike down individual mandates. The Volokh Conspiracy website. http://volokh.com/2010/03/23/more-on-thechances-courts-would-strike-down-the-individual-mandate/. Published Mar. 23, 2010.
o. My own foray into this topic is: Richman B. Behavioral economics and health policy: understanding Medicaid’s failure. Cornell L Rev.
2005;90(3):705-768.
p. Some health statistics detailing how the United States compares to other OECD nations are available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.as
px?QueryName=254&QueryType=View.
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overspending and squeezing out other social investments.
Hopefully any debate over the constitutionality of the
Patient Protection Act will not distract the public from the
substantial work that remains. NCMJ
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